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Abstract 
 
National framework conditions mediate the effect of technological capabilities of 
firms on their productivity. Although this has been recognized in the literature for a 
long time, a quantitative test that explicitly considers this hypothesis has been 
lacking. Using a World Bank datasets of about 19,000 firms in 42 countries, most of 
which are developing, we estimate a multilevel production function with effects of 
firm’s technological capabilities nested in the national framework conditions. Our 
results confirm that various facets of firm’s technological capabilities and national 
economic, technological and institutional conditions influence total factor 
productivity of firms. Furthermore, we find that the effects of the national conditions 
and firm’s technological capabilities are closely intertwined with each other. 
Adherence to international standards, formal training of workers and access to 
technology through foreign ownership make more difference for productivity of firms 
in less developed countries, while R&D capabilities on the contrary boost 
significantly more performance of firms in countries at the technological frontier. 
Different features of the national framework are shown to be responsible for this.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic development is a multilevel problem. Many factors at various levels of aggregation 
chip in. Firms invest in research and development (R&D), adopt new technologies and train their 
workers how to use them productively. Governments design policies aimed to, at least in an ideal 
world, provide infrastructure, incentives, stability and other framework conditions that boost 
innovation and ultimately economic growth. Still other factors often out of reach for firms or 
even governments, such as deeply rooted institutional, social or cultural context, play a role too. 
The main proposition of this paper is that none of these is likely to be the dominant, or sufficient, 
driver of productivity alone, that factors operating at the different levels intertwine with each 
other, and therefore their effects should be studied in an integrated multilevel framework. To 
show how this can be done, we construct and estimate a hierarchical model that allows us to 
examine these multilevel interactions in a more complete way than the literature on economic 
development has been able to do so far.  
 
Since Schumpeter (1934, 1939 and 1943), economists have been challenged to study how the 
“micro, mezzo and macro” spheres of the economy jointly evolve in the process of economic 
development. Endogenous growth models have gone a long way to elaborate the thesis of 
increasing returns driven by knowledge spillovers between firms and other organizations 
(Romer, 1986; Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Even broader 
framework conditions have been emphasized in the literature on technological catching up 
(Abramovitz, 1986; Fagerberg, 1987; Verspagen, 1991). Neo-Schumpeterian perspectives on 
long waves drew attention to the (mis)match between the techno-economic system and socio-
institutional characteristics in diffusion of new technologies (Perez, 1983). Nevertheless, these 
contributions and the vast empirical research that has recently followed from them are distinctly 
macroeconomic, with implicit micro foundations, but focusing on the national patterns. Not 
much specific has been said, in contrast to Schumpeter’s interest in the entrepreneur, competition 
and structural change, about the multilevel interactions in this literature. 
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Explicitly micro-founded is the thesis about survival of firms propelled by innovation, but 
determined by the environment, which is at the core of growth modeling in evolutionary 
economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Here the focus is on dynamic interactions between 
heterogeneity of firms given by their technology, selection environment given by markets and 
innovation. But in this approach the interaction goes one-way, it is predominantly bottom-up in 
the sense that the macro patterns become derived as aggregations of micro outcomes, so that 
distinctly macro phenomena are lacking. As Castellacci (2007) rightly laments, understanding of 
how behavior of firms is shaped by specific characteristics of the macro environment, even 
though repeatedly called for (Dosi, 1997; Dosi and Nelson, 2010), remains limited in this 
tradition. Econometric evidence on these models also remains quite rare. 
 
Multilevel thinking about economic development, at least at the conceptual level, has become 
emblematic for systemic approaches to innovation (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist 
1997). At the core of this perspective figures a firm as the basic unit of the analysis, but the firm 
is not seen in isolation, the firm is embedded in a national innovation system. Innovation and 
therefore development is portrayed as a collective problem, which cannot be fully understood by 
focusing at a single level of analysis. According to this approach, performance of firms is 
affected by the framework conditions, which in turn feeds back to the aggregated level, so 
forming the essential link between micro and macro patterns. Synergies, feedbacks and 
interactions between private and public actors within complex macrostructures naturally become 
the main focus of these studies. Needless to say, formal modeling of relations like these proves to 
be difficult, especially in a dynamic framework, which prevented the systemic perspective to be 
formalized into mathematical models so far (Fagerberg et al. 2004; Lundvall et al., 2009). 
 
Studies of technological upgrading in developing countries have long argued for a need to 
recognize not only capabilities at the firm level, but also the role of the national environment for 
technological change (Kim, 1980; Dahlman et al., 1987; Lall, 1992). Lessons from 
industrialization in South-East Asia, the most favorite subject of these studies, offer a 
particularly strong practical support for the multilevel perspective. It is well known that 
development efforts of firms (and their groups, networks or associations) on the one hand and the 
government on the other hand have been purposefully coordinated in Japan, later the Asian 
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Tigers or more recently China, which generated some of the most spectacular development 
spurts, while dusty infrastructure, excessive bureaucracy and macroeconomic, social and 
political instability have bulldozed upgrading efforts of firms elsewhere). Similarly to the 
systemic perspective, however, this literature has not been forged into formalized models and 
econometric testing of the underlying hypotheses is therefore extremely rare (Figueiredo, 2006). 
 
All too many questions remain unanswered, because an integrated framework to quantitatively 
analyze the multilevel interactions in economic development is lacking. Could it be that returns 
on technological capabilities developed by firms critically depend on national economic, 
technological, institutional and other framework conditions? Does it pay off for firms to invest in 
their own R&D capabilities in a country with poor technological infrastructure? Should on the 
other hand governments design, sequence and prioritize policies according to what the firms are 
capable of doing? Should governments in developing countries maintain public R&D 
infrastructure, even if there are very few incumbent firms with noticeable R&D capabilities to 
benefit from it? Should they rather use their limited resources to improve basic education, 
because this bears fruits for a broad stratum of firms? Should they insist on price stability, much 
in line with IMF’s recommendations, or is this rather myopic policy, perhaps except of 
hyperinflation, for boosting productivity of firms? Can we find support for such multilevel 
interactions in econometric analysis based on hard data? Can we model this in a concise way? 
 
Econometric estimates using micro data to investigate the relationship between R&D, innovation 
and productivity have become increasingly synchronized to use the same model on datasets from 
different countries, so that the results can be directly compared between them (Lööf et al., 2003; 
Griffith et al., 2006; Raffo et al., 2008; OECD 2009). Some researchers have even been able to 
pool micro data from different countries (Janz et al., 2004; Mohnen et al., 2006; Goedhuys et al., 
2008a), which allowed them to include dummies to capture the country effects. Using these 
conventional methods, however, we are able to detect whether the national differences matter, 
which is often the case, but we can only speculate what exactly drives them. Moreover, the effect 
of firm’s technological efforts on their productivity is likely to differ by country too, but we have 
learnt very little from these studies about the mechanisms how the micro and macro effects 
interact with each other.  
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To handle hypotheses identified at different levels like these, the method of multilevel modeling 
has been developed in the recent econometric literature (Goldstein, 2003). A multilevel model, 
sometimes also called a ‘hierarchical’, ‘random coefficient’ or ‘mixed-effect’ model is a 
statistical model that relates the dependent variable to predictor variables at more than one level 
(Luke, 2004). If a hierarchical structure of data exits, the major assumption of standard models 
that observations are independent from each other is likely to be violated. By relaxing this 
assumption, multilevel models allow us to properly estimate the extent to which differences 
between the higher-level units, such as countries, are accountable for performance at the micro 
level, in this case the productivity of firms.  In addition, in a more complex model, we can 
examine whether the country conditions interact with the technological efforts the firms 
undertake individually to raise productivity, in other words to which extent the contextual effects 
reinforce or weaken the link between firms’ technological capabilities and their productivity.  
 
The aim of the paper is to address exactly this kind of questions. To illuminate the multilevel 
interactions, we need micro data from many countries and a set of macro indicators that capture 
the salient aspects of the nation framework conditions, in which the firms operate. For this 
purpose, we pool micro data from 42 countries, derived from the Productivity and Investment 
Climate Survey (PICS) organized by the World Bank (2003), which provides harmonized 
information on technological capabilities of firms and their performance, such as value added, 
capital stock and employment, that are necessary to estimate the production function. In addition 
we collect from various sources a battery of macro indicators, which capture not only the overall 
level of development, but also direct measures of the quality of research infrastructure, education 
system, institutional framework and macroeconomic stability, and test their explanatory power in 
the multilevel framework. More specifically, we estimate the multilevel specification of a Cobb-
Douglas production function to explain differences in total factor productivity as a function of 
firm-level capabilities, national framework conditions and a combination thereof.   
 
As far as we know, this is the first time multilevel modeling is used to study how the various 
macro factors affect productivity of firms. So far multilevel modeling has been applied in 
education studies, health science, human geography and biology, but rarely in the field of 
economics, innovation or development studies; with the exception of the recent papers by 
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Srholec (2008, 2010), which used this methodology to study national and regional effects on 
innovativeness of firms, but not their productivity. Clearly, the enormous requirement on scale 
and scope of data to estimate a multilevel model has been a major reason for a lack of such 
evidence, because one needs micro data with significant variation across countries, but also a 
sufficient number of observations per country to run meaningful inferences. As new sources of 
data emerge from national statistical offices and international organisations, however, multilevel 
modeling becomes a viable method to econometrically study those more complex relationships 
that have been hypothesized in the theoretical literature for quite some time.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains multilevel modeling, outlines a 
multilevel production function with effects of firm’s technological capabilities nested in the 
national environment and debates relevant methodological issues. Section 3 introduces the PICS 
micro dataset. Section 4 brings in measures of the national framework conditions. Section 5 
delineates the empirical model and presents results of the econometric estimates. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2. A multilevel production function of firms nested in countries 
 
Assume a 2-level structure, with firms at level-1, nested in countries at level-2. A standard 
1-level regression model would be the following: 
 
(1) yij = β0j + β1j xij + eij 
 
where yij is the dependent variable, such as in our case firm’s productivity, xij is the firm-level 
explanatory variable (or a vector of variables), β0j is the usual intercept, β1j is the usual slope 
coefficient, eij is the error term, i is the firm (i = 1…m) and j is the country (j = 1…n). Note that 
by putting subscript j, we allow for more than one country in the analysis, but formulate the 
equation separately for each of them, generating different intercepts and different slope 
coefficient per country. If we are interested only in this relationship, we can estimate 
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the n models independently, resulting in different parameters for each country and a common 
intra-country residual variance.  
 
Since the intercept and slope coefficients vary across countries, they can be referred to as 
‘random coefficients’, with a certain mean value, variance and distribution, which can be 
explicitly modeled in a multilevel framework.  By constructing a multilevel model, in other 
words, we allow the firm-level relationships to differ by countries and aim to explain (at least 
some of) the variance by introducing country-level predictors. A 2-level model with explanatory 
variables at both firm and country levels thus emerges, if we let the intercept β0j and slope β1j 
become random variables: 
 
(2) Level-1 model: 
  yij = β0j + β1jxij + eij 
 Level-2 model: 
 β0j = γ00 + γ01zj + u0j 
  β1j = γ10 + γ11zj + u1j 
 
where zj is the level-2 or country predictor (or a vector thereof) and u0j and u1j are normally 
distributed error terms for each level-2 equation, which are assumed to be independent from the 
level-1 error eij. Since the country effects are identified by the subscript j, we have a hierarchical 
system of regression equations, where we are allowing each country to have a different average 
outcome represented by the intercepts (β0j) and a different effect of the level-1 predictor (β1j) on 
the outcome. Although a different level-1 model is estimated for each country, as apparent from 
the j subscripts in the level-1 parameters, the level-2 equation is defined for all of them and the γ 
coefficients are not assumed to vary across countries.  
 
By substituting β0j and β1j into the level-1 model and rearranging we can write the entire model 
in a single equation: 
 
(3)  yij = γ00 + γ01zj + γ10 xij + γ11zjxij + (u0j + u1jxij + eij) 
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where in brackets is the random part and the rest contains the fixed part of the model. As 
discussed by Goldstein (2003), the presence of more than one residual term makes the traditional 
estimation procedures such as ordinary least squares inapplicable and therefore specialized 
maximum likelihood procedures must be used to estimate these models. For more details on 
these estimators see Raudenbush, et al. (2004).  
 
A major assumption of single-level models is that the observations are independent from each 
other. If a nested structure of data exits, units belonging to the same group tend to have 
correlated residuals and the independence assumption is likely to be violated. By relaxing this 
assumption, multilevel modeling provides statistically more efficient estimates, which are more 
“conservative”, as Goldstein (2003) puts it, than those ignoring the hierarchical nature of data1. 
Statistically significant relationships that have been established in the literature by using the 
standard methods may come out not significant in the multilevel analysis. A lot that we have 
learned empirically about the link between technological capabilities and productivity from 
research on data identified at a single level might appear different in the multilevel framework.   
 
A partial solution to account for the compositional effects, as already noted above, is to ignore 
the random variability associated with the higher-level factors and include into the estimate fixed 
effect dummies that correspond to the hierarchical structure of the data, such as dummies for 
location of firms in different countries. Using dummies might be a useful quick-fix solution, if 
the purpose only is to control for the compositional effects, but it is of a little help if the prime 
interest is in effects of the higher-level factors or cross-level interactions themselves. Although 
we may detect rough patterns of the structure, a dummy is a “catch-all” variable for which we 
can only speculate what it really represents. After all, if the country dummies significantly 
improve the predictive power of the model, which is typically the case in econometric estimates, 
a multilevel analysis should be chosen.   
                                                 
1
 It should be noted, however, that not only multilevel modeling relaxes the standard independence assumption on 
residual terms Spatial autocorrelation techniques have been developed to produce valid statistical inferences if errors 
tend to be correlated regionally (Fotheringham et al. 2000). Also survey design and analytical tools recognize the 
need to take into account the hierarchical structure of the population (Skinner et al. 1989) Although these procedures 
are deemed to be necessary to obtain efficient estimates, the higher-level effects typically do not merit a serious 
interest themselves. Multilevel modeling is best suited to look closely at the patterns and consequences of 
hierarchical structure of the phenomena in question. 
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More specifically, we analyze how productivity of firms is influenced by firms’ own 
technological capabilities and how this link is affected by national framework conditions.  We 
use a Cobb Douglas framework as point of departure. Firm i in country j‘s value added Yij is a 
function of the traditional factors of production, physical capital Kij and labour Lij.   The total 
output that is produced with these inputs depends on the firms’ level of productivity, captured by 
parameter A, which is a function of the activities the firms undertake to build up technological 
capabilities and firm-specific knowledge: 
   
(4) Yij = A(Tij) Κijδ1jLijδ2j eij  
Here δ1j and δ2j denote marginal productivities of physical capital and labour, respectively, Tij 
represents technological capabilities of firms. The stochastic term eij summarizes other 
unobservable factors affecting firms output.  Taking the log-linear form of this equation, and 
simplifying the notation, we get the following specification: 
 
(5.1) yij = α0j + ∑
=1t
ijtjtTβ + δ1j kij + δ2j lij + eij 
 
where yij=lnYij; kij=lnKij; lij=lnLij; Tijt is a vector of t variables that are hypothesised to be related 
to TFPij, such as proxies for technological capabilities or foreign ownership.  These variables are 
of major interest in this study along with their corresponding vector of coefficients βjt. The main 
aim is to find out to which extent they differ by countries and whether we can explain these 
differences by country variables.  Therefore, what is specific to our analysis it that we let the 
intercept α0j and the slopes of the technological Tijt variables βjt become random variables, in the 
following way: 
(5.2) α0j = γ00 + ∑
=
γ
1n
n0 NATIONjn + u0j 
 βjt = γt0 + ∑
=
γ
1n
tn NATIONjn + u1j  
where NATIONjn is a vector of n variables that capture specific aspects of the national 
framework conditions given, for example,  by research infrastructure, educational system, 
regulation or macroeconomic stability. Instead of controlling for these effects by country 
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dummies, we investigate how relevant these specific national factors are for explaining TFPij of 
firms. Also, we allow the slopes of the technological variables to vary with national conditions; 
in other words, we allow the link between technological capabilities or ownership of firms and 
their productivity to be different along different national settings. Finally, u0j and u1j are normally 
distributed error terms for each equation that represent other unobserved national factors. 
 
3. Micro data 
 
One reason why multilevel modeling has not been widely applied in this field so far is the 
demanding requirement on the scope and quality of data. To properly estimate a multilevel 
model, we need micro data for a number of higher level units, such as countries, with a 
reasonable number of observations within each of them. For a long time a dataset that would 
allow this type of analysis has not been around, but this has changed with the recent availability 
of micro data from the Productivity and Investment Climate Survey (PICS) organized by the 
World Bank. About 19,000 observations from 42 countries can be used in the econometric 
estimates. 
 
Firms were asked about various aspects of their business activity, including information on 
financial variables and a set of questions on technological capabilities, in a questionnaire 
harmonized across many developing countries (for more details on methodology of the survey 
see World Bank, 2003). To estimate the production function, we need a measure of output, 
capital and labor. Yij refers to value added, measured by the difference between sales (turnover) 
and the sum of material and energy costs.  The capital stock, Kij , is measured by the sum of the 
net book value - the value of assets after depreciation - of machinery and equipment (including 
vehicles), land and buildings at the end of the fiscal year. Labor input, Lij, is measured as the sum 
of full-time permanent and seasonal (temporary) employees. Both Yij and Kij are expressed in 
constant USD according to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) derived from World Bank (2007). All 
of these variables are used in logs, denoted by small caps, as explained in the previous section. 
 
14 
Besides the traditional production function variables, the dataset provides information on 
industry, foreign ownership and technological variables. Sectors were difficult to identify 
because somewhat different classifications had been used in the various national datasets. For 
this reason we can distinguish only between 9 broad sectors as follows: 1) Agro, food and 
beverages; 2) Mining, energy, water and recycling;  3) Apparel, garments, leather and textiles; 4) 
Chemicals; 5) Wood, paper, non-metal materials and furniture; 6) Metallurgy, machinery, 
electronics and transport equipment; 7) Construction and transport; 8) Retailing; and 9) Services 
n.e.c. (including wholesale, hotels and restaurants, tourism, repairing, real estate, information 
technology and other services). Sectoral dummies INDi are further introduced in the econometric 
estimate to control for the sectoral patterns, with “Metallurgy, machinery, electronics and 
transport equipment” as the base category.  
 
Equally essential to take into account are resources of firms directly devoted to search, 
absorption and generation of new technology. Research and development (R&D) is the 
traditional, and for a long time the only, seriously considered indicator. R&Dij is defined as a 
dummy with value 1 if the firm devotes expenditure on this activity. The aim of this variable is 
to capture a general commitment to R&D. An important insight of the literature on innovation in 
developing countries, however, is the broad and multifaceted nature of technological capabilities 
(Bell and Pavitt, 1993). Arguably, innovation is about much more than just spending on R&D, so 
that we need to keep an eye on these broader aspects of capabilities as well.    
 
Besides the R&D variable, the dataset provides information on adherence to ISO norms, the use 
of internet in the business and formal training of employees. ISOij is a dummy with value 1 if the 
firm has received ISO (e.g. 9000, 9002 or 14,000) certification and thus reflects a capability to 
conform to international standards. ICTij is a dummy with value 1 if the firm regularly uses a 
website in its interaction with clients and suppliers, which captures the potential for user-
producer interactions mediated by the internet. SKILLij is a dummy with value 1 if the firm 
provides formal (beyond “on the job”) training to its permanent employees. And finally, the 
variable FORij refers to share of foreign ownership, which is important to take into account, 
because foreign-owned firms benefit from access to technologies developed by the parent 
company abroad. 
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It is interesting to note that many of these facets of technological capabilities, such as the use of 
information technologies, quality control and training, have been emphasized as particularly 
relevant but under-measured in the context of developing countries in the third edition of the 
Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005, pp. 141-144). Along these lines the PICS data provide much richer 
evidence as compared to what can be derived from most of the innovation surveys that have been 
conducted in developing countries so far. 
 
A basic overview of the dataset is given in Table 1. The sample comprises about 19,000 firms 
with non-missing information. 2  A quick look at the composition of the sample reveals widely 
different firms in terms of size, endowments and ownership. Averages of the variables reflecting 
technological capabilities are self-explanatory, and will be examined in more detail later in the 
econometric framework. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the micro sample 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
yij 19,219 13.55 2.14 3.74 24.12 
kij 19,219 13.18 2.24 4.03 22.59 
lij 19,219 3.71 1.58 0 11.08 
R&Dij 19,219 0.30 0.46 0 1 
ICTij 19,219 0.45 0.50 0 1 
ISOij 19,219 0.21 0.40 0 1 
SKILLij 19,219 0.42 0.49 0 1 
FORij 19,219 0.07 0.24 0 1 
 
 
4. Macro data 
 
A natural starting point to examine the cross-country differences is to look at patterns of the 
micro dataset by country, which is revealed in Table 2. Surveys conducted in 42 countries are 
included, most of which are developing. A particularly thorny issue is whether the data are 
                                                 
2
 It should be mentioned that about 50 observations have been already excluded at this point, because they have been 
identified as major multivariate outliers on the base of Mahalanobis distance computed for sales per employee, costs 
per employee and capital stock per employee. 
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representative. Since we fully acknowledge this concern, we have included into the sample only 
national datasets with a reasonable number of observations given size and structure of the 
country. Even these could be seen as a relatively low number by some observers; in particular by 
those in developed countries who have the fortune to analyze large datasets. Nevertheless, most 
of the sample comes from developing countries for which micro data (particularly on 
technological capabilities) are extremely scarce, so that we should not judge this dataset by 
standards of the most advanced countries. In fact, one can find plethora of papers in the literature 
based on samples of a few hundreds of firms, which at least implicitly claim to be representative 
to the context in question. Indeed, much more extensive micro data on technological capabilities 
of firms in a reasonably large number of developing countries is not likely to emerge anytime in 
the near future.3 
 
                                                 
3
 Some developing countries have conducted surveys based on the CIS methodology (UNU-INTECH 2004), but 
access to micro data from these surveys remains limited, which prevents pooling them together for the purpose of 
multilevel analysis.  
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Table 2: Overview of the sample by country 
 
Country Year exp(GDPCAPj) Obs. yij kij lij 
Algeria 2006 7,101 96 13.42 12.94 3.38 
Argentina* 2005 10,027 344 14.49 13.60 3.93 
Bangladesh* 2006 1,071 1,173 12.76 12.90 4.58 
Bolivia* 2005 3,672 163 13.17 13.50 3.59 
Brazil* 2002 7,960 1,432 14.00 13.10 4.04 
Chile* 2005 11,646 320 14.07 13.36 3.74 
China 2002 2,888 1,114 14.44 14.31 4.49 
Colombia* 2005 5,682 196 13.49 13.12 3.60 
Costa Rica* 2004 8,399 196 12.16 12.08 2.77 
Ecuador 2005 6,394 225 13.89 13.30 3.64 
Egypt* 2003 4,304 716 12.43 13.12 3.60 
El Salvador 2005 5,103 295 13.41 12.73 3.88 
Ethiopia* 2005 575 205 12.90 13.28 4.26 
Germany 2004 29,922 1,047 13.97 13.37 2.95 
Greece 2004 27,137 428 13.33 12.83 2.30 
Guatemala* 2005 4,042 259 13.02 12.28 3.56 
Honduras* 2005 3,171 189 12.89 12.35 3.36 
Hungary 2004 15,563 326 13.58 13.67 3.11 
India* 2004 1,941 1,503 12.43 12.29 3.28 
Indonesia* 2002 2,795 306 14.39 14.36 5.25 
Ireland 2004 35,814 386 14.05 13.61 3.02 
Korea 2004 19,787 392 14.42 14.02 2.96 
Madagascar 2004 790 115 14.40 13.31 4.12 
Mexico* 2005 11,142 731 13.43 12.85 3.47 
Morocco* 2002 3,107 636 13.67 12.98 4.22 
Nicaragua* 2005 2,237 204 12.11 11.64 3.03 
Pakistan* 2001 1,917 802 12.90 12.77 3.45 
Paraguay* 2005 3,772 90 13.33 13.11 3.52 
Peru* 2005 6,159 232 13.75 12.95 3.82 
Philippines* 2002 2,650 450 13.18 12.48 4.41 
Poland 2004 12,488 586 12.96 12.75 2.59 
Portugal 2004 19,950 391 13.80 12.98 2.79 
Romania 2004 8,356 214 13.38 12.84 3.55 
Saudi Arabia 2004 19,881 558 14.71 14.33 4.35 
South Africa 2002 7,577 420 15.64 14.48 4.80 
Spain 2004 26,294 408 13.99 13.30 2.87 
Thailand* 2002 5,865 604 14.58 14.32 4.85 
Turkey* 2004 9,068 448 14.31 14.01 4.09 
Ukraine 2004 4,833 176 13.62 13.19 3.63 
Uruguay* 2005 8,581 142 13.24 12.41 3.26 
Vietnam 2004 1,888 414 13.21 13.27 3.64 
Zambia* 2006 1,188 287 12.17 11.71 3.40 
Total sample .. 8,875 19,219 13.55 13.18 3.71 
Note: *Manufacturing firms only. 
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Since we use a multilevel model, we need data for specific country-level variables that capture 
the salient features of the national framework conditions.  To reduce the influence of shocks and 
measurement errors occurring in specific years, we use these indicators in the form of three-year 
averages over a period prior to the year when the survey was conducted, if not specified 
otherwise below.4 This also limits the extent of missing data, which is crucial in a sample 
containing many developing countries. Still missing information had to be estimated for some 
countries, which is explained for the particular indicators below. 
 
As an all-encompassing variable, before turning to more specific indicators of the national 
conditions, we use log of GDP per capita (in PPP, constant 2000 international USD), denoted by 
GDPCAPj, which represents the general level of economic development. This variable is a strong 
correlate to most other relevant variables such as proxies for quality of the science, research and 
educational systems, governance and institutional framework (Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008).  
Therefore, we first – in a basic specification of the model – include only this predictor at the 
macro level in an attempt to find out whether the overall development level matters for the firm-
level link between technological capabilities and productivity. In other words, is it more 
rewarding for firms to engage in R&D, invest in ICT and training or obtain an ISO certificate in 
an economically more (or less) developed country? Some previous empirical studies have 
revealed that technological variables have limited effect on productivity of firms in the least 
developed countries, but that rather other factors that are related to the business environment and 
are beyond the control of the firm are more relevant (Goedhuys et al, 2008a and 2008b; Eifert, 
Gelb and Ramachandran, 2005). It is thus interesting to investigate the effect of GDPCAPj on the 
slope coefficients of the capability variables.   
 
For the more specific characteristics of the national framework, a natural starting point is to 
consider the quality of the national science, research and educational systems (Nelson, 1993). 
Availability of research infrastructure, like universities, R&D labs and a pool of researchers in 
the labor force, reduce costs and uncertainties associated with firm’s innovative activities, and 
are likely to generate positive externalities in the economy. Although some part of these 
                                                 
4
 Since the surveys were conducted in different years, we computed averages over the three-year periods prior to the 
reference period of the particular survey. 
 
19 
resources is devoted to basic research, most research in developing countries is arguably geared 
toward fostering the capacity to assimilate knowledge from abroad rather than to generate new 
knowledge at the frontier. We measure this aspect of the national conditions by the GERDj 
variable, which refers to general expenditure on research and development as % of GDP and 
covers the sectors of private businesses, government, higher education institutes and other public 
organizations. Information for this variable has been gathered from various sources, including 
UNESCO, RICYT and World Bank (2007). 
  
Education, which is at the heart of what Abramovitz (1986) would refer to as “social 
capabilities”, and which Baumol, et al. (1989), Verspagen (1991) and many others have shown to 
be a crucial variable for explaining successful technological catching up, is a must to take into 
account. We represent this aspect of the national framework conditions by literacy. LITERAj 
refers to the literacy rate in adult population (% of people ages 15 and above), and has been 
derived from UNESCO. Since there is a relatively low frequency of this indicator, we use data 
from the latest year available, and complement the information in few cases by estimates from 
various issues of the Human Development Report.5 
 
Another relevant feature of the institutional framework is regulation of business, for which data 
from the “Doing Business” project of the World Bank - following Djankov, et al. (2002), and 
Botero, et al. (2004) - come very handy. REGULj is the composite “Ease of doing business 
index”, which refers to scores of countries on ten topics covered in the Doing Business dataset 
(starting a business, employing workers, registering property, enforcing contracts, etc.), and is 
supposed to represent the ease (or difficulty) to do business in the country given the existing 
regulatory burden on the firms; for more details see World Bank (2005). Lower scores indicate 
more business-friendly regulations and vice-a-versa. Unfortunately, data for the index exist only 
from 2005 onwards, so that we do not compute the three-year averages for this indicator, and use 
only the earliest period available. But scores on this index tend to be highly stable in the short 
term.  
                                                 
5
 It would have been perhaps preferable to have data on educational attainment of the population by primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels, but this information is not available for many countries in the sample. Similarly, data 
on science and engineering education, which would have been interesting to take into account, is unfortunately not 
widely available. 
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Macroeconomic instability has always been an essential part of the economic picture in 
developing countries, and in the recent period, turbulences along these lines are also worrisome 
for more advanced economies. Because innovation is a very uncertain venture in itself, 
characteristics of the environment that further increase the uncertainty of returns on innovation 
projects, such as symptoms of macroeconomic volatility, should hinder technological catching 
up and slows down productivity. We use the rate of inflation to capture the macroeconomic 
conditions. INFLATj reflects price stability, which is measured by the geometric average of 
inflation indicated by the consumer price index derived from World Bank (2007). 
 
An overview of the macro variables is given in Table 3. There is a lot of variety in the sample, 
ranging from the least developed countries (Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Madagascar) to advanced 
European economies (Germany, Ireland and Spain). Some of them rank among the most 
technologically intensive countries in terms of GERDj (Germany and Korea), while many others 
maintain negligible technological infrastructure. LITERAj may not be very relevant indicator in 
studies confined to developed countries, because virtually all of them maintain close to complete 
literacy, but this sample contains a lot of diversity along this dimension, including several 
countries with more than a third of the population being illiterate (Ethiopia, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Morocco and India). As far as the REGULj variable is concerned, there are 
countries with fairly liberalized economies (Ireland and Thailand), as well as those with a 
relatively tight grip of the government on the business sector (Egypt, India and Ukraine). 
INFLATj is limited to single digits in most countries and moderate levels elsewhere (Romania, 
Turkey and Zambia), but fortunately there are no countries in the sample with rampart inflation 
rates that would make them major outliers. It should be noted, finally, that correlation between 
these variables is quite modest, except for the overlap with the GDPCAPj variable that is 
included separately, so that the regression estimates do not suffer from multicollinearity 
problems (see Appendix for the correlation table). 
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Table 3: Overview of the macro sample 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDPCAPj 42 8.65 1.00 6.36 10.49 
GERDj 42 0.50 0.58 0 2.67 
LITERAj 42 84.84 16.04 35.90 99.66 
REGULj 42 85.74 39.39 10 164 
INFLATj 42 5.43 3.55 -0.15 16.31 
 
 
 
5. Estimation and results 
 
Adding the variables and sector dummies developed in previous section to the multilevel 
production function, the estimated equation becomes:  
 
(6) Firm-level model: 
yij =    α0j + β1j R&Dij + β2j ICTij + β3j ISOij + β4j SKILLij + β5j FORij +  
 
δ0 kij + δ1 lij + ∑
=
δ
1m
m2 INDim + ∑
=
δ
1m
m3 INDim kij + ∑
=
δ
1m
m4 INDim lij + eij 
 
Country-level model: 
α0j = γ00 + ∑
=
γ
1n
n0 NATIONjn + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + ∑
=
γ
1n
n1 NATIONjn + u1j 
β2j = γ20 + ∑
=
γ
1n
n2 NATIONjn + u2j 
β3j = γ30 + ∑
=
γ
1n
n3 NATIONjn + u3j 
β4j = γ40 + ∑
=
γ
1n
n4 NATIONjn + u4j 
β5j = γ50 + ∑
=
γ
1n
n5 NATIONjn + u5j 
 
where i is a firm, j is a country, INDim = 1 ... m is the set of sector dummies and NATIONjn = 1 
... n ∈ GDPCAPj ∨ (GERDj, LITERAj, REGULj, POLITYj, INFLATj).  
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From this follows that α0j is the conditional productivity level of firms operating in country j, in 
other words the average total factor productivity (TFPij), which is indentified by the estimated 
grand intercept γ00 and the various country effects ∑
=
γ
1n
n0 on the total factor productivity. In a 
similar fashion, effects of the capability variables β1j, β2j ...  β5j are allowed to differ by country, 
because they are given not only by the estimated means of the slope coefficients γ10, γ20 ... γ50 
across countries, but also by the cross-level interactions between the firm- and country-level 
predictors ∑
=
γ
1n
n1 , ∑
=
γ
1n
n2  ...  ∑
=
γ
1n
n5 .  Error terms u0j for the intercept and u1j, u2j ... u5j for the 
slope coefficients indicate that these effects vary not only as a function of the predictors but also 
as a function of unobserved country effects (assumed to be sampled from a normal distribution 
with expected zero mean and variance = σ2u). Finally, δ0, δ1, δ2m, δ3m and δ4m indicate the usual 
fixed effects in the production function framework and eij is the firm-level error term.6 
 
To improve interpretability of the results, we centre the production function predictors kij and lij 
and their cross-products with INDi by deducting mean, so that these variables enter the 
estimation with zero mean. We standardize the country-level predictors NATIONj by deducting 
mean and dividing by standard deviation, so that these enter the estimation with zero mean and 
standard deviation equal to one. All of the predictors, including the proxies for firm-level 
technological capabilities, therefore have meaningful zero-points, which greatly simplifies 
interpretation of the estimated parameters.7  In addition, we can directly compare the magnitude 
of the estimated country-level effects, because the standardization procedure transforms the 
predictors to units of standard deviation and the unobserved random effects are measured in 
standard deviation too. Since the firm-level capability variables are dummies, the magnitude of 
their coefficients is comparable by definition.   
 
                                                 
6
 δ0, δ1, δ2m, δ3m and δ4m can be allowed to differ by country by adding another 2 + 3*m equations to the country-
level layer of the model, but this would consume too many degrees of freedom and prohibit us from estimating 
robust standard errors of the multilevel interaction effects that are the main focus of this paper. Unfortunately, there 
is a narrow limit to how many country-level parameters we can estimate in a sample consisting of 42 countries. 
7
 For instance, the intercept α0j becomes the outcome of a firm that is characterized by average capital and labour 
(kij, lij = 0), fully domestic-owned (FORij = 0), without technological capabilities (R&Dij, ICTij, ISOij, SKILLij = 0), 
operating in the base industry (INDi) and in an average country (NATIONj = 0); eij and u1j, u2j ... u5j have mean of 
zero by definition.  
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Table 4 gives the first set of results. 8 Fixed effects are reported in the upper part, while random 
effects are in the lower part of the table. For the sake of space, we do not report the estimated 
fixed effects of INDi and their interaction terms with kij and lij, though they are included in these 
estimates. First, we consider a “basic” model with only firm-level explanatory variables, but 
allow the estimated intercept and slope coefficients of the technological variables to vary across 
countries by including the respective random effects. Second, we examine a so-called “intercept-
as-outcome” model, which adds the country-level predictor GDPCAPj only for the intercept. 
Third, we estimate a full “slopes-as-outcomes” model, which relates the country-level predictor 
GDPCAPj to both the intercept and slopes of the firm-level technological variables. GDPCAPj is 
used as the only country-level predictor for now, leaving the other national factors for more 
detailed investigation below, in order to avoid problems of multicollinearity.  
 
Results of the basic model are presented in the first column in Table 4. Even though there are no 
country-level predictors, the random effects reveal to which extent the intercept (TFPij),  returns 
on the capability variables and the effect of foreign ownership differ by country. 9 Overall, there 
is a lot of variability in the average level of firm’s productivity across countries. It can be easily 
calculated that for 67% of the countries, TFPij lies in the range of [12.55, 13.55] and for 95% of 
the countries average TFPij lies in the range of [12.05, 14.05]. 10 All of the firm-level fixed 
effects come out statistically significant and with the expected signs. But also the estimated 
coefficients of the capability and ownership variables appear widely distributed around the mean 
highlighting their sensitivity to the national framework conditions.  
 
                                                 
8
 A specialized statistical software Hierarchical Linear and Non-linear Modeling (HLM) version 6.04 was used to 
estimate the equations. See Raudenbush et al. (2004) for details on the estimation procedure. 
9
 Since the HLM (version 6.04) package assumes that the variances may not be normally distributed, a chi-square 
test of the residuals is performed (Raudenbush, et al. 2004). Nevertheless, this should be interpreted with caution 
because the variances are bounded at zero by definition, while we generally expect the residuals to be non-zero, so 
that the meaning of their statistical significance is not the same as for an ordinary variable. 
 
10
 A useful characteristic of the standard deviation is that with normally distributed observations, about 68% of the 
observations lie less than one standard deviation from the mean, and about 95% of the observations lie between two 
standard deviations below and above the mean. Thus, for the grand mean TFP, 68% of countries have average TFP 
lying in the range [13.05-0.50, 13.05+0.50] or [12.55, 13.55], while 95% of countries have mean TFP lying in the 
range [13.05-2*0.50, 13.05+2*0.50] or [12.05, 14.05].  In a similar way, the slope coefficients vary across countries 
and the distribution of the coefficients can be analysed. It illustrates how the effect of capabilities on productivity 
varies across countries. 
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R&Dij boosts value added for given inputs by 0.15, confirming that this aspect of technological 
capabilities is relevant in the context of most developing countries. However, a closer look at 
distribution of this coefficient reveals that for 68% of the countries the effect of R&D on 
productivity lies in the range of [0.03, 0.27], which indicates that for firms in countries with the 
least favorable conditions the positive effect of R&D on productivity does not hold, while in 
countries with the most enabling environment R&D is a strong productivity enhancing activity. 
For 95% of the countries the coefficient lies in the range of [-0.09, 0.39], so that the effect of 
R&D on productivity is estimated to be even negative in a small number of countries. Normally, 
this is difficult to envisage, but in extremely adverse conditions, for instance during a steep 
slump of aggregate demand, the negative relationship may start to kick in.  
 
As compared to the other capability variables, the magnitude of the R&Dij coefficient is similar 
to the effect of SKILLij, but almost half of the estimated effect of ICTij and ISOij. R&D matters 
for firms in many countries, but it is not the only and even not necessarily the most important 
aspect of technological capabilities, especially if we consider the joint effect of the other 
variables. Similarly their effects are significantly distributed around the mean. For 68% of the 
countries, the coefficient is estimated in the range of [0.13, 0.37] for ICTij, [0.14, 0.34] for ISOij 
and [0.04, 0.22] for SKILLij. Hence, adoption of ICT solutions and adherence to ISO norms 
seem to be a relatively safe bet for firms, even if they have to operate in quite difficult national 
environment, while investment into R&D facilities and formal training of employees require 
supporting conditions to make a tangible difference for productivity. 
 
FORij has an even larger coefficient, which confirms the prevailing productivity gap between 
foreign- and domestic-owned firms, because the foreign affiliates benefit from access to 
technology developed by the parent company. The mean effect is a rise of TFPij by 0.40, but 
within a large range of [-0.06, 0.86] in 95% of the countries; in other words from a fairly dual 
economy that is typical for most developing countries to roughly equal productivity in both 
groups of firms that is commonplace in advanced economies, from where most of the leading 
multinational companies originate. It is clear that overall, the national differences clearly matter 
for performance of firms, indeed an encouraging finding for the more detailed analysis below, in 
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which we attempt to pin down specific characteristics of the national framework conditions with 
which these effects vary.   
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Table 4: Econometric results along the level of economic development 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Fixed part:    
For Interceptij (α0j)    
Interceptij (γ00) 13.05 (0.27)*** 13.06 (0.25)*** 13.05 (0.25)*** 
GDPCAPj (γ01) .. 0.40 (0.07)*** 0.39 (0.07)*** 
For R&Dij slope (β1j)    
R&Dij (γ10) 0.15 (0.04)*** 0.15 (0.04)*** 0.14 (0.04)*** 
GDPCAPj (γ11) .. .. 0.05 (0.02)** 
For ICTij slope (β2j)    
ICTij (γ20) 0.25 (0.03)*** 0.25 (0.03)*** 0.24 (0.03)*** 
GDPCAPj (γ21) .. .. 0.03 (0.03) 
For ISOij slope (β3j)    
ISOij (γ30) 0.24 (0.04)*** 0.24 (0.04)*** 0.25 (0.04)*** 
GDPCAPj (γ31) .. .. -0.08 (0.02)*** 
For SKILLij slope (β4j)    
SKILLij (γ40) 0.13 (0.03)*** 0.13 (0.04)*** 0.13 (0.03)*** 
GDPCAPj (γ41) .. .. -0.04 (0.02)* 
For FORij slope (β5j)    
FORij (γ50) 0.40 (0.07)*** 0.40 (0.07)*** 0.41 (0.06)*** 
GDPCAPj (γ51) .. .. -0.09 (0.05)* 
    
kij (δ0) 0.33 (0.05)*** 0.32 (0.05)*** 0.33 (0.05)*** 
lij (δ1) 0.64 (0.11)*** 0.64 (0.11)*** 0.64 (0.11)*** 
INDi (δ2m) Yes Yes Yes 
INDi ki (δ3m) Yes Yes Yes 
INDi li (δ4m) Yes Yes Yes 
    
Random part:    
Interceptij (u0j) 0.50 (2,294)*** 0.32 (728)*** 0.32 (737)*** 
R&Dij slope (u1j) 0.12 (102)*** 0.13 (103)*** 0.12 (99)*** 
ICTij slope (u2j) 0.12 (84)*** 0.12 (83)*** 0.13 (85)*** 
ISOij slope (u3j) 0.10 (62)** 0.10 (62) 0.08 (49) 
SKILLij slope (u4j) 0.09 (65)** 0.10 (65)** 0.08 (59)** 
FORij slope (u5j) 0.23 (96)*** 0.23 (96)*** 0.21 (87)*** 
eij 1.059 1.058 1.058 
Deviance 57,013 56,981 56,962 
Level-1 observations 19,219 19,219 19,219 
Level-2 groups 42 42 42 
 
Note: Linear unit-specific model; full maximum likelihood estimate; coefficients and robust standard errors in 
brackets reported for the fixed effects; standard deviation and Chi-square in brackets reported for the random 
effects; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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Next, in the second column in Table 4, we present the intercept-as-outcome model, which 
incorporates the GDPCAPj variable into the model as a predictor of the intercept, but lets the 
firm-level effects remain “unconditional” at the country level. The main hypothesis is that firms 
located in more advanced countries achieve higher productivity with given inputs, because they 
benefit from all sorts of geographically bounded advantages (or even external economies) thanks 
to the fact of being embedded in more supportive (but also demanding) environment. This 
prediction is firmly supported by the results, because the effect of GDPCAPj on the intercept is 
positive and highly significant, even after controlling for the firm-level effects and allowing for 
the random country differences in the multilevel framework. Moreover, the random country 
effect for the intercept has decreased by about one third to a magnitude slightly lower than the 
estimated effect of one standard deviation difference in GDPCAPj, which shows that a healthy 
part of the cross-country variety is related to the overall level of development, but also that 
substantial part of the picture remains unexplained by this variable.  
 
Even more interesting is to investigate whether the estimated slopes of the R&Dij, ICTij, ISOij, 
SKILLij and FORij firm-level predictors vary along the development level of the country, which 
is the purpose of the last estimate presented in Table 4. In other words, the “slopes-as-outcomes” 
model examines not only whether GDPCAPj directly affects the intercept, but also whether the 
level of development has an indirect impact on the total factor productivity by mediating the 
respective firm-level relationships. Given the large random differences across countries detected 
above, the idea is to test whether the capability and ownership effects on productivity vary with 
the level of development of the country.   
 
The main result is, first, a positive and fairly significant interaction between the GDPCAPj and 
R&Dij variables, which signals that the effect of internal R&D activity of firms increases with 
the development level of the country. Hence, firms benefit more from their R&D activity if 
located in an advanced environment with superior quality of the science base, technological 
infrastructure, education and other complementary assets to their own innovative efforts. Second, 
a highly statistically significant cross-level interaction has been detected between GDPCAPj of 
the country and adherence to ISOij standards at the firm-level. The negative sign of this 
interaction term indicates that, in contrast to the previous case, the ISO certificate contributes 
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relatively more to productivity of firms in less developed countries. This indicates that the ability 
to adhere to international quality standards makes more difference in an environment, where 
most other firms are not readily able to meet these requirements. In addition, the respective 
random effect ceased to be statistically significant at the conventional levels, though the Chi-
square significance test of the random effects should be interpreted with caution, as already 
noted above. After all, the magnitude of the random effects remains quite high for all of the 
coefficients. 
 
Similar conclusions with regards to the sign can be drawn from the interaction between 
GDPCAPj and SKILLij variables, although this terms is only weakly statistically significant.  
Formal training of the work force is more important for raising productivity in less developed 
countries than in more advanced economies, pointing at failures of the educational system in the 
former. Also negative, but only weakly significant, is the interaction between GDPCAPj and 
FORij, which confirms that the productivity gap between foreign- and domestically-owned firms 
tends to narrow with higher levels of development of the country. The interaction term of 
GDPCAPj and ICTij did not come out statistically significant, so that the effect of using internet 
for interaction with clients and suppliers seems to be of a truly global nature, regardless of 
whether the country is advanced or not.   
 
In sum, while the firm-level technological capability variables seem to be strongly positively 
correlated with productivity levels, the magnitude of these effects differs markedly for countries 
at different levels of development, with adherence to ISO standards and formal training of 
workers to be the driving forces for productivity in less developed countries, while R&D activity 
is shifting productivity of firms upwards more in advanced economies. Foreign ownership makes 
a big difference for productivity, but mainly in developing countries. Admittedly, these broad 
patterns are relevant for introducing the debate, but not very useful for deriving concrete insights 
about characteristics of the environment that hinder or boost productivity of firms. Hence, in the 
next step, we turn to the more detailed country-level predictors. 
 
Table 5 gives the results. Since GDPCAPj tends to be highly correlated to most of the more 
detailed indicators, we do not include these in the model at the same time, but replace the 
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GDPCAPj predictor by the GERDj, LITERAj, REGULj and INFLATj variables. First, we 
estimate the full specification of the model. However, the number of parameters to be estimated 
becomes far too large to generate robust standard errors, so that in the second column we 
simplify the model by not controlling for the interaction terms between capital, labor and 
industry dummies INDi ki and INDi li, which solves the problem without changing the key 
results. Finally, in the last column, we use the backward stepwise selection procedure to 
eliminate those effects involving the country-level predictors that do not significantly contribute 
to predictive power of the model.11 Exactly half of them have been ruled out this way, which 
gives noticeably a more concise specification used for deriving predictions of the model below.  
 
                                                 
11
 At the beginning of this procedure, we estimate the full model, and then stepwise eliminate the least statistically 
significant effects of the country-level predictors, including their cross-level interactions, until arriving at a model 
that includes only effects significant at a chosen level. GERDj and SKILLij interaction is significant at 12% level, so 
that we keep this effect, because it reasonably contributes to predictive power of the model. It should be noted that 
none of the other eliminated effects appeared significant at more than 20% level. 
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Table 5: Econometric results with detailed indicators of national framework conditions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Fixed part:    
For Interceptij (α0j)    
Interceptij (γ00) 13.06 (0.12)*** 13.27 (0.09)*** 13.27 (0.09)*** 
GERDj (γ01) 0.10 (0.07) 0.10 (0.05)* 0.12 (0.04)** 
LITERAj (γ02) 0.17 (0.06)** 0.17 (0.07)** 0.18 (0.07)*** 
REGULj (γ03) -0.16 (0.07)** -0.16 (0.07)** -0.15 (0.06)** 
INFLATj (γ04) -0.06 (0.06) -0.06 (0.08) .. 
For R&Dij slope (β1j)    
R&Dij (γ10) 0.15 (0.03)*** 0.16 (0.04)*** 0.15 (0.04)*** 
GERDj (γ11) 0.06 (0.03)** 0.06 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.02)*** 
LITERAj (γ12) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) .. 
REGULj (γ13) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) .. 
INFLATj (γ14) 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) .. 
For ICTij slope (β2j)    
ICTij (γ20) 0.25 (0.03)*** 0.26 (0.03)*** 0.26 (0.03)*** 
GERDj (γ21) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) .. 
LITERAj (γ22) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.02)* 
REGULj (γ23) -0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) .. 
INFLATj (γ24) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.05) .. 
For ISOij slope (β3j)    
ISOij (γ30) 0.26 (0.03)*** 0.26 (0.04)*** 0.26 (0.04)*** 
GERDj (γ31) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) .. 
LITERAj (γ32) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) .. 
REGULj (γ33) 0.08 (0.03)*** 0.08 (0.03)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 
INFLATj (γ34) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) .. 
For SKILLij slope (β4j)    
SKILLij (γ40) 0.11 (0.02)*** 0.12 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.03)*** 
GERDj (γ41) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)* 0.03 (0.02) 
LITERAj (γ42) -0.05 (0.02)** -0.05 (0.02)* -0.04 (0.02)* 
REGULj (γ43) 0.05 (0.02)** 0.05 (0.02)** 0.06 (0.02)** 
INFLATj (γ44) -0.05 (0.02)** -0.05 (0.03)* -0.05 (0.02)** 
For FORij slope (β5j)    
FORij (γ50) 0.39 (0.05)*** 0.39 (0.06)*** 0.40 (0.06)*** 
GERDj (γ51) 0.00 (0.05) 0.01 (0.04) .. 
LITERAj (γ52) 0.04 (0.06) 0.04 (0.05) .. 
REGULj (γ53) 0.11 (0.06)** 0.11 (0.06)** 0.09 (0.04)** 
INFLATj (γ54) -0.06 (0.05) -0.06 (0.05) -0.09 (0.04)** 
    
kij (δ0) 0.32 (0.01)*** 0.29 (0.02)*** 0.29 (0.02)*** 
lij (δ1) 0.64 (0.02)*** 0.71 (0.06)*** 0.71 (0.06)*** 
INDi (δ2m) Yes Yes Yes 
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INDi ki (δ3m) Yes No No 
INDi li (δ4m) Yes No No 
   
Continued on the next page   
Continued from the previous page   
    
Random part:    
Interceptij (u0j) 0.36 (902)*** 0.36 (896)*** 0.36 (926)*** 
R&Dij slope (u1j) 0.09 (82)*** 0.08 (78)*** 0.09 (82)*** 
ICTij slope (u2j) 0.13 (86)*** 0.13 (88)*** 0.13 (88)*** 
ISOij slope (u3j) 0.07 (44) 0.07 (40) 0.06 (40) 
SKILLij slope (u4j) 0.05 (41) 0.05 (42) 0.05 (42) 
FORij slope (u5j) 0.20 (80)*** 0.21 (81)*** 0.21 (82)*** 
eij 1.058 1.061 1.061 
Deviance 56,949 57,026 57,029 
Level-1 observations 19,219 19,219 19,219 
Level-2 groups 42 42 42 
 
Note: Linear unit-specific model; full maximum likelihood estimate; coefficients and robust (except of the first 
column) standard errors in brackets reported for the fixed effects; standard deviation and Chi-square in brackets 
reported for the random effects; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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GERDj comes out with a significantly positive coefficient for the intercept, if robust standard 
errors are estimated, which supports the existence of knowledge spillovers and other broadly 
beneficial effects for total factor productivity of firms located in countries with superior research 
infrastructure. Since GERDj significantly interacts with the R&Dij and SKILLij variables defined 
at the firm level, there seems to be credible evidence that these beneficial effects become 
substantially reinforced, almost jointly doubled in magnitude, for firms with their own R&D and 
formal training capabilities. In other words, firms gain considerably more from their own R&D 
investment if located in countries with high concentration of R&D activity, which underlines the 
role of absorptive capacity for firms to benefit from this source of localized external economies. 
Likewise, the training capabilities of firms seem to enhance this kind of benefits, although their 
contribution appears less significant. From the policy perspective, this result suggests that 
investment in research infrastructure yields tangibly positive effects on a broad stratum of firms 
indeed, though these resources become much more productive if the local firms come forward 
with nurturing appropriate absorptive capacity by themselves. Governments certainly should not 
neglect research infrastructure, but firms have their job to do too.  
 
LITERAj seems to exert even stronger direct influence on productivity of firms, through the 
effect on the intercept. As can be expected, the literacy rate has a positive effect, suggesting that 
all kinds of firms greatly benefit from access to educated labor force. Here, we should 
emphasize, that this result should be really interpreted as a joint effect of basic education, 
because most other relevant indicators tend to be highly correlated to the literacy rate. LITERAj 
seems to boosts the effect of ICTij capabilities, which is natural because important synergic 
effects should be in play here, even though this cross-level interaction comes out only weakly 
statistically significant in the last specification. Nevertheless, the interaction term between 
LITERAj and SKILLij comes out significantly negative, which indicates that these national- and 
firm-level capabilities substitute rather than complement each other. To achieve desired 
productivity levels, firms tend to leverage deficiencies of national education systems by 
establishing their own training programs. Arguably, this regularity in the data is a strong policy 
finding, because this highlights a systemic failure of governments in developing countries to 
furnish incumbent firms with educated people they demand to produce effectively. General 
education must be clearly a priority for every government serious about economic development.  
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Excessive regulation of business, given by a high score on the REGULj variable, directly cripples 
total factor productivity of firms, and triggers complex interaction effects with their 
characteristics. Admittedly, the direct negative effect on the intercept can be easily attributed to 
extra costs, delays and friction induced by the regulatory burden, which makes doing business 
generally less efficient. Both of the significant interaction terms with firm’s capabilities come out 
with a positive coefficient, suggesting that these variables shift productivity in the same 
direction. In other words, ISOij and SKILLij capabilities pay off more for firms operating in more 
regulated environment. Stricter regulatory framework may directly require firms to obtain the 
certificates to access certain markets, such as rules for public procurement, environmental 
protection, etc., which may not make a difference for productivity in more liberal environment. 
Just to keep up with the numerous regulations, firms may also need to train their employees more 
often than elsewhere. Moreover, a quality certificate signals to other contracting parties that the 
firm is a high-performer on quality management issues (Terlaak and King, 2006; Swann et al., 
1996), which is especially beneficial when information asymmetries are large and when firms 
fear opportunistic behavior of their partners (King et al., 2005). To the extent that the REGULj 
variable can be understood as a proxy for quality of the broader institutional framework, such as 
lack of trust, erratic informal relations or general “culture” of regulation in the whole economy, 
firms that can demonstrate their credentials with the quality certificate naturally come out more 
competitive.  
 
REGULj also comes out with a strongly positive interaction with the FORij variable for foreign 
ownership of firms. Since domestic-owned firms appear to be much more severely exposed to 
the adverse effects of regulation, this result provides evidence that the existing regulatory 
frameworks produce unfair competitive environment between the different modes of ownership. 
Foreign-owned firms manage to escape the curse of excessive bureaucracy in one way or 
another. Examples of why this is the case are abound, including exceptions from regulations, 
such as from red tape, labor code, customs or tax breaks, granted to foreign affiliates as a form of 
investment incentives used by governments in many developing countries to attract foreign direct 
investment. On the other hand, this can be given by the ownership advantage itself, because 
foreign firms might be on average better equipped to deal with the regulatory requirements, 
perhaps thanks to a superior administrative capacity, access to better legal services and/or 
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stronger lobbyist power to leverage the unproductive regulations. In any case, policymakers 
should take this result as an opportunity to rethink the discriminatory regulations that contribute 
to the productivity gap between foreign- and domestic-owned firms. It is interesting to notice in 
this context that the FORij effect seems to be largely independent of the GERDj and LITERAj 
framework conditions, in other words of those most intimately related to the technological level 
of the country, which signals that ceteris paribus these benefit firms regardless of the ownership 
divide. 
 
Macroeconomic instability, represented by the INFLATj variable, does not seem to have a strong 
direct effect on the total factor productivity of firms, but comes out with a couple of significant 
interaction terms. This indicates that this aspect of the framework conditions matters more for a 
certain kind of firms than others, which is consistent with the macroeconomic literature that has 
recognized for a long time that the effects of inflation tend to be distributed unevenly. As far as 
the effect on productivity of firms is concerned, we find that inflation thwarts returns on formal 
training and affects foreign-owned firms more negatively than their domestic counterparts. 
Generally speaking, a stable macroeconomic environment should facilitate returns on 
technological capabilities, because unpredictable fluctuations in market conditions undermine 
particularly returns on long-term investment of this kind, so that the negative interaction with the 
training capability of firms comes out in line with expectations. Foreign-owned firms benefit 
from easier access to technology, market and credit from abroad, which mirrors in their generally 
superior productivity, but this also makes them more exposed to instability of the local currency. 
Domestic-owned firms, on the other hand, tend to be relatively less integrated in the global 
economy, which turns out to be beneficial for them in times of macroeconomic instability. It is 
acknowledged that volatility rather than the level of inflation might be more relevant to take into 
account, but these effects tend to be closely correlated in this sample, and therefore not possible 
to distinguish in the estimate. It should be also noted that strong threshold effects are likely to be 
involved here, because hyperinflation has obviously disastrous effects on the economy. As 
already noted above, however, this sample includes only countries with relatively modest rates of 
inflation, which is fortunate for us, because we do not have to wrestle with influence of major 
outliers on the estimates.  
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So much for what we have been able to explain. But equally insightful in the context of 
multilevel modeling is the residual variance. Many of the random effects remain relatively 
strong, except perhaps of those for the ISOij and SKILLij slope coefficients, which indicates that 
a noticeable part of the diversity across countries has not been accounted for by the country-level 
predictors. As already emphasized above, however, we had to constrain ourselves to a relatively 
small set of national predictors, because of the limited number of countries in the sample. At the 
same time, other relevant indicators of the national framework conditions that one may rightly 
point out to be potentially relevant, such as those for the financial system, governance, political 
system, globalization and last but not least aggregate demand conditions, could not have been 
included in the estimates, because these tend to be excessively correlated to the incumbent 
variables, and we therefore leave them for more detailed examination in future multilevel 
research. Besides other relevant country-level variables that may exist, the unexplained 
differences could be related to idiosyncratic national factors, which certainly should not be 
neglected in cross-country comparative research given these results. Although we have been able 
to identify quite strong regularities, there is arguably a limit to how much we can explain by 
quantitative methods. To illuminate the rest is a task for more detailed qualitative research, 
which can dive even more deeply into the specific national context. 
 
Not much has changed in the estimates of the firm-level effects, which confirms that these are 
remarkably robust to the specification of the country-level part of the model. It should be noted 
that an inspection of both the firm-level and country-level residuals has not revealed a major 
problem with outliers in either of the estimates. Yet some countries might be outliers with 
regards to the more detailed national conditions. Mahalanobis distance based on the GERDj, 
LITERAj, REGULj and INFLATj variables has identified the following countries as multivariate 
outliers (with statistical significance of the distance and the main outlining indicator in brackets): 
Turkey (10%; INFLATj); Ethiopia (10%; LITERAj); Germany (1%; GERDj) and Korea (1%; 
GERDj). Korea and Germany come out as the outliers, because the sample is predominantly 
composed of developing countries. GERDj amounts to 2.67% and 2.50% in Korea and Germany 
respectively, but there are only three other countries in the sample with more than 1.00% 
(Ireland, Spain and Ukraine) and the sample average is 0.50% only. Not surprisingly, the effects 
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of GERDj are most sensitive to exclusion of Korea and Germany from the sample.12 But these 
countries are not outliers in technological intensity when compared to other developed countries. 
Even though both of them rank quite high on the global technology ladder, there are at least two 
dozens other countries with similar (or even higher) technology intensity of their economies 
(Fagerberg et al., 2007). If more developed countries were included in the sample, Korea and 
Germany would most likely not come out much different from the main pack, so that there 
would be more robust support for making inferences in this tail of the distribution. It well might 
be, therefore, that the effects of GERDj based on the full sample are credible, because these 
results will be confirmed in estimates on datasets including more developed countries in the 
future. 
 
To demonstrate implications of the multilevel model, we compare the predicted productivity of 
firms in various situations. As already anticipated above, we base these predictions on the most 
concise specification of the model in the last column of Table 5, which has been derived from the 
backward stepwise selection procedure. Table 6 shows the predictions. Horizontally, we alter 
characteristics of the firm with regards to the extent of technological capabilities Tij ∈ (R&Dij, 
ICTij, ISOij, SKILLij), for which we put forward scenarios of firms without (all equal to zero) or 
with extensive (all equal to one) capabilities, and with regards to the extent of foreign ownership 
(FORij) with the categories of fully domestic-owned (FORij=0) or foreign-owned (FORij=1) 
enterprises. Vertically, there are different combinations of the national framework conditions 
given by both the observed (fixed) and unobserved (random) country effects. For the random 
country effects (u0j … u5j), we compute predictions for one standard deviation into the positive 
territory, mean country (all equal to zero) and one standard deviation into the negative territory. 
For the fixed country effects NATIONj ∈ (GERDj, LITERAj, REGULj, POLITYj, INFLATj), we 
differentiate between countries with their best, mean (all equal to zero), and worst combination.13 
All other effects remain constant at zero, so that the prediction always refers to a firm with mean 
                                                 
12
 If we estimate the simplified specification of the model used in the second column in Table 5, but exclude Korea 
and Germany from the sample, the GERDj effect on the intercept and its interaction term with R&Dij come out 
significant only at 20% level, while its interaction term with SKILLij turns out insignificant at the conventional 
levels. Estimates of the other effects change only marginally. 
13
 In other words, we rank countries according to the prediction for each situation given their observed country 
predictors, which reveals either Korea (FORij=0) or Germany (FORij=1) at the top with the best combination and 
Ethiopia in every case at the bottom with the worst conditions. 
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capital and labor (kij, lij = 0) in the base industry (INDi) and with mean firm-level residual (eij = 
0). The prediction is expressed in terms of exp(yij), hence in constant USD in PPP, relatively to a 
reference case of a fully domestic-owned firm with extensive technological capabilities located 
in a representative “average” country (Tij=1 ˄ all else equal to zero). 
 
Table 6: Predictions of exp(yij) based on the backward stepwise selection estimate (the 
reference firm=100) 
 
 Tij=0 Tij=1 Tij=1 
 FORij=0 FORij=0 FORij=1 
    
+1 st. dev. of random country effects:    
Best combination of fixed country effects 152 535 914 
Mean (zero) fixed country effects  65 199 367 
Worst combination of fixed country effects 34 101 182 
    
Mean (zero) random country effects:    
Best combination of fixed country effects 106 268 372 
Mean (zero) fixed country effects 45 100 149 
Worst combination of fixed country effects 24 50 74 
    
-1 st. dev. of random country effects:    
Best combination of fixed country effects 74 135 151 
Mean (zero) fixed country effects 32 50 61 
Worst combination of fixed country effects 17 25 30 
 
Note: All else hold constant at zero (kij, lij, INDi, eij = 0); Tij ∈ (R&Dij, ICTij, ISOij, SKILLij). 
 
 
At this point, interpretation of the predictions should be clear. Firm-level technological 
capabilities offer a substantial premium for productivity. All else equal to average, firms armed 
with the full set of capabilities are estimated to achieve 2.2 times (100/45) higher productivity 
than those without them. Foreign ownership of firms, as already obvious from the estimated 
coefficient, makes a substantial difference too. But this is not the full story, because the national 
framework conditions have powerful implications. Holding all other effects to average, the 
reference firm located in Korea with the best combination of the fixed country effects is 
estimated to be 2.7 times (268/100) more productive than a firm with the same characteristics in 
a hypothetical “average” country and even 5.4 times (268/50) more productive than an otherwise 
same firm operating in Ethiopia with the worst observed conditions. If we factor into the 
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equation the unobserved (random) country effects, the productivity differences become even 
more dramatic, simulating in the far corners of the table productivity gaps of the magnitude 
observed between the advanced and least developed countries in the world economy. Overall, the 
national framework conditions have a substantial effect on performance of firms, but at the same 
time much also depends on what firms are capable of doing themselves. One can at least partly 
compensate for the other, but the most powerful forces shifting productivity materialize in their 
joint effects. Arguably economic development is not about achievements of the government on 
one side and firms on the other, but essentially about what they accomplish in concert. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Using a multilevel framework, we estimated a model of productivity of firms with effects of their 
technological capabilities nested in national framework conditions. Our results confirm the 
important role of the national factors for explaining differences in performance of firms. 
Furthermore, the estimates reveal significant indirect influence of the national framework 
conditions on productivity of firms through interaction with the various proxies for firm’s 
technological capabilities. Indeed, while on average the firm-level technological capability 
variables seem to be positively correlated with their productivity, the magnitude of these effects 
differs markedly across countries.  Here we find that training of workers, adherence to standards 
and foreign ownership are important driving forces for productivity in less developed countries, 
R&D on the contrary is shifting productivity more in advanced economies.  Different features of 
the national framework come out to be responsible for this. 
 
Multilevel modeling appears to be a promising item in the tool box of research on technological 
capabilities, which may allow us to formally test complex predictions of the contextual 
perspectives on economic development. Although we have constrained ourselves only to 2-level 
multilevel model in this paper, there is a variety of specifications of the model that in principle 
could be estimated. A straightforward extension would be to take into account a more 
complicated hierarchical structure. For example, we can specify 3-level models with firms in 
regions within countries or so-called cross-classified models with firms simultaneously nested in 
sectors and countries, which take into account the sectoral differences even more seriously than 
we have been able to do. All that matters is access to suitable data, which unfortunately remains 
scarce, especially for the least developed nations.  
 
A major weakness of this paper that needs to be reiterated is that to the extent that firms are 
mobile across countries, in other words their location is endogenously determined, the results 
cannot be interpreted in terms of causal relations. One can discuss how much are the firms under 
consideration really mobile, except of course the foreign-owned strata of the sample, which is 
actually quite limited, because the average share of foreign owners is less than 10% in this 
sample of firms. Nevertheless, from a methodological point of view this is something that is well 
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taken and certainly should be one of the priorities to clarify in future research. Arguably, 
however, this is “the chicken or the egg” type of dilemma, which is very difficult to resolve 
without extensive panel data at the micro level from a large number of countries, which is 
unfortunately not likely to become available anytime soon. 
41 
References 
 
Abramovitz, M. (1986) Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind. Journal of Economic 
History, 46, 386-406. 
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt. (1992) A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction. 
Econometrica, 60, 323-351. 
Baumol, W. J.,  Batey Blackman, S. A., Wolff, E. N. (1989) Productivity and American 
Leadership: The Long View. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Bell, M., Pavitt, K. (1993) Technological Accumulation and Industrial Growth: Contrasts 
between Developed and Developing Countries. Industrial Corporate Change, 2, 157-210. 
Botero, J. C., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, A. (2004) The Regulation of 
Labor. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp. 1339-1382. 
Lundvall, B.-Å., Joseph, K.J., Chaminade, C. and Vang, J. (2009) Handbook of Innovation 
Systems and Developing Countries. Building Domestic Capabilities in a Global Context. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Castellacci, F. (2007) Evolutionary and new growth theories. Are they converging? Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 21, 585-627. 
Dahlman, C.J., Ross-Larson, B., Westphal, L. (1987) Managing technological development. 
Lessons from the newly industrialized countries. World Development, 15, 759-775. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, R., Shleifer, A. (2002) The Regulation of Entry. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1-37. 
Dosi, G. (1997) Opportunities, Incentives and the Collective Patterns of Technological Change. 
Economic Journal, 107, 1530-1547. 
Dosi, G. and Nelson, R. (2010) Technical Change and Industrial Dynamics as Evolutionary 
Processes. In Hall, B. and Rosenberg, N. (eds.): Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, 
North Holland, forthcoming 
Edquist, C. (1997) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations. Pinter: 
London. 
Eifert, B., Gelb, A., Ramachandran, V. (2005). Business environment and comparative 
advantage in Africa: Evidence from the Investment Climate Data. Center for Gobal 
Development, working paper 56. 
Fagerberg, J. (1987) A Technology Gap Approach to Why Growth Rates Differ. Research 
Policy, 16, 87-99. 
Fagerberg, J., Mowery, D., Nelson, R. (2004) The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Fagerberg, J., Srholec, M., Knell., M. (2007) The Competitiveness of Nations: Why Some 
Countries Prosper While Others Fall Behind. World Development, 35, 1595-1620. 
Fagerberg, J. and Srholec, M. (2008) National Innovation Systems, Capabilities and Economic 
42 
Development. Research Policy, 37, 1417-1435. 
Figueiredo, P. N. (2006) Introduction. International Journal of Technology Management, 36, 1-
13. 
Fotheringham, A. S., Brunsdon, C. and Charlton, M. (2000) Quantitative Geography: 
Perspectives on Spatial Data Analysis. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
Goedhuys, M., Janz, N., Mohnen, P. (2008a) Knowledge-based productivity in low-tech 
industries: evidence from firms in developing countries. UNU-MERIT Working Paper. 
Goedhuys, M., Janz, N., Mohnen, P. (2008b) What drives productivity in Tanzanian 
manufacturing firms: technology or business environment? European Journal of 
Development Research, 20, 199-218. 
Goldstein, H. (2003) Multilevel Statistical Models. London: Arnold. 
Griffith, R., Huergo, E., Mairesse, J. and Peters, B. (2006) Innovation and productivity across 
four European countries. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22, 483-498. 
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1990) Comparative advantages and long run growth. 
American Economic Review, 80, 796–815. 
Janz, N., Lööf, H., & Peters, A. (2004). Firm level innovation and productivity - is there a 
common story across countries? Problems and Perspectives in Management, 2, 1–22.  
Kim L., (1980) Stages of development of industrial technology in a developing country: a model. 
Research Policy, 9, 254-277. 
King A.A., Lenox M.J. and Terlaak A. (2005). The strategic use of decentralized institutions: 
exploring certification with the ISO 14001 management standard. Academy of management 
journal, 48, 1091-1106.  
Lall, S. (1992) Technological capabilities and industrialization, World Development, 20, 165-
186. 
Lööf, H., Heshmati, A, Asplund, R. and Nås, S. O. (2003) Innovation and performance in 
manufacturing industries: A comparison of the Nordic countries. The Icfaian Journal of 
Management Research, 2, 5-35. 
Luke, A. (2004) Multilevel Modeling. London: Sage Publications. 
Lundvall, B. Å. (1992) National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and 
Interactive Learning. Pinter Publishers: London. 
Mohnen, P., Mairesse, J., Dagenais, M. (2006) Innovativity: A comparison across seven 
European countries. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 15, 391-413. 
Nelson, R., (1993) National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford University 
Press: New York. 
Nelson, R., Winter, S.G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
OECD (2005) Oslo Manual. 3rd edition. OECD: Paris. 
OECD (2009) Innovation in Firms: A Microeconomic Perspective. Paris: OECD. 
43 
Perez, C. (1983) Structural change and assimilation of new technologies in the economic and 
social systems. Futures, 15, 357–375. 
Raffo, J., Lhuillery, S., Miotti, L. (2008) Northern and southern innovativity: a comparison 
across European and Latin American countries. European Journal of Development Research, 
20, 219-239. 
Raudenbush, S. W., Bryk, A. S., Cheong, Y. F., & Congdon, R. T. (2004) HLM: Hierarchical 
Linear and Nonlinear Modeling. Chicago: Scientific Software International, Inc. 
Romer, P. (1986) Increasing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 
1002–1037. 
Schumpeter, J. (1934) The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge (MA): Harvard 
University Press. 
Schumpeter, J. (1939) Business Cycles. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Schumpeter, J. (1943). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper. 
Skinner, C.J., Holt, D. and Smith, T.M.F. (1989) Analysis of complex surveys. Wiley, New York. 
Srholec, M. (2008) A Multilevel Analysis of Innovation in Developing Countries. University of 
Oslo, TIK Working Paper on Innovation Studies 20080812, 
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/tikinowpp/20080812.htm  
Srholec, M. (2010) A Multilevel Approach to Geography of Innovation. Regional Studies, 44, 
forthcoming. 
Swann P, Temple P and Shurmer M (1996) Standards and Trade Performance: the UK 
Experience. The Economic Journal, 106, 1297-1313.  
Terlaak A., King A.A. (2006) The effect of certification with the ISO 9000 Quality Management 
Standard: A signaling approach. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 60, 579-
602. 
UNU-INTECH (2004) Designing a policy-relevant innovation survey for NEPAD. UNU-
INTECH: Maastricht. 
Verspagen, B. (1991) A New Empirical Approach to Catching up or Falling Behind. Structural 
Change and Economic Dynamics, 2, 359-380. 
World Bank (2003) Productivity and Investment Climate Survey (PICS): Implementation 
Manual. World Bank: New York. 
World Bank (2005) Doing Business Indicators. World Bank: New York. 
World Bank (2007) World Development Indicators 2007. World Bank: New York. 
44 
 
Appendix : Correlation matrix between the country-level predictors (N=42) 
 
  GDPCAPj GERDj LITERAj REGULj INFLATj 
GDPCAPj 1.00     
GERDj 0.54 1.00    
LITERAj 0.71 0.37 1.00   
REGULj -0.58 -0.44 -0.32 1.00  
INFLATj -0.30 -0.25 -0.08 0.29 1.00 
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